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A TALE OF MARGINALIZATION: COMPARING WORKERS WITH
DISABILITIES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
RAVI MALHOTRA*
RiSUMik
Dans cet article, jentreprends une analyse comparative de la loi canadienne et am6-
ricaine sur les droits des personnes handicap~es dans le contexte de 1emploi, afin de
mieux comprendre les d~fis et les succ~s dans chacun des deux pays. Bien que la loi
canadienne ait fourni beaucoup de protection pour les personnes qui deviennent han-
dicap~es alors qu'elles sont d6jA sur le march6 du travail, des barri~res structurelles
dans la communaut6, sp~cialement dans le domaine des transports, pr~sentent des
diffictlt~s importantes pour les personnes handicap~es. Cela est plus particulire-
ment le cas pour les personnes handicap~es dont les handicaps se manifestent avant
quelles n'entrent sur le march6 du travail. A l'inverse, bien que la loi am~ricaine sur le
travail et l'antidiscrimination fournisse des protections relativement marginales pour
les personnes handicap~es dans le contexte de 1emploi-vu la r6alit6 du d~clin des
syndicats-il y a eu, n6anmoins, de nombreuses r~ussites dans 1'limination de barri-
res dans la collectivit6. Au risque de froisser les sensibflit~s de nombreux nationalistes
canadiens, je suggre que nous avons beaucoup apprendre de nos cousins am~ri-
cains en ce qui concerne les droits des personnes handicap~es. J'explore quelques unes
des raisons derriere cette divergence, en apparence paradoxale, en examinant de pros
deux exemples typiques de barri~res dans chaque pays : les transports et les services
auxiliaires pour les personnes handicap6es. Pouss~s par l'activisme politique de la base
syndicale sur le terrain, les am~ricains sont tr~s clairement des pionniers d'enkvement
de barri~res dans le domaine des transports. Cependant, il reste encore beaucoup de
travail a faire dans les deux pays en ce qui concerne la fourniture de services auxili-
aires de qualit6 pour les personnes handicap~es.
T he tale of marginalization of people with disabilities reoccurs across industrial-
ized countries. Whereas scholars such as Esping-Anderson have eloquently
developed theories that distinguish between types of welfare states, 1 relatively little
comparative legal scholarship has explored why people with disabilities remain
impoverished and disenfranchised in so many different countries with a variety of
* Assistant professor, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa.
1. See generally Gosta Esping-Anderson, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990).
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political systems and legal frameworks. 2 In this article, I compare the socio-economic
circumstances of Canadians and Americans with disabilities and discuss some of the
important barriers that they face, in order to tease out some of the reasons there are
both striking similarities and profound differences.
First, I provide an overview of the socio-economic status of Canadians and Americans
with disabilities, including insight into the labour market status and the poverty in
which many in both countries live. I caution at the outset that methodological issues
relating to differences in the definition of disability mean that statistical comparisons
of the performance of the two countries must be undertaken with caution. 3 The data
presented are intended to communicate the common marginality of many people
with disabilities in both countries. Next, I provide an overview of systemic barriers
in transportation and attendant care services that assist people with disabilities with
activities of daily living such as bathing, dressing and toileting. These barriers play
a major role in the low levels of education, unemployment and poverty that plague
the disability community. Then I briefly outline the state of disability rights law as
it affects workers with disabilities in the two countries and give the reader a basic
understanding of the jurisprudence. In Canada, I centre my analysis on leading deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of Canada and the relevant arbitral jurisprudence. In
the United States, the focus is on the Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA] and
the jurisprudence that has been generated under Title I of the ADA, dealing with
employment discrimination. Through comparative analysis, I try to crack the puzzle
of why Canada has relatively generous policies toward employees with disabilities yet
has such poor environmental accessibility which inhibits labour market attachment
for many people with disabilities. Finally, I summarize my conclusions.
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES
Canada
One in seven Canadians-or more than 4.4 million people-has a disability.4
Unfortunately, Canadians with disabilities remain marginalized in terms of all the
major indicators commonly used to measure socio-economic status. Labour market
participation is an especially important criterion because employment provides both
2. An important exception is Brendon D. Pooran & Cara Wilkie, "Failing to Achieve Equality: Disability
Rights in Australia, Canada and the United States" (2005) 20 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 1.
3. Personal communication, Aron Spector, senior researcher, Strategic Policy Research Directorate, Hu-
man Resources and Skills Development Canada (24 October 2007), observing that labour market sta-
tistics relating to disability are defined differently in Canada and the United States.
4. Canada, Advancing the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2008 (Ottawa: Human Resources and Skills
Development Canada, 2008) at 2, citing data from 2006 Participation and Activity Limitation Survey
(PALS), online: Statistics Canada <http://ww.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/071203/dq071203a-eng.
htm>.
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a path out of poverty5 and a sense of accomplishment and self-worth for many.6 As
Vicki Schultz observes, "[W]ork has been fundamental to our conception of the good
life. It has been constitutive of citizenship, community, and even personal identity"7
Yet the new economy that has accompanied globalization presents dramatic new
prospects and perils for workers with disabilities as the very meaning of what con-
stitutes work has been profoundly altered with the decline of long-term full-time
employment and the growth of part-time contingent labour8 trends that have been
exacerbated by the current global recession.
How severe is the economic marginalization of Canadians with disabilities? Statistics
released by the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, which uses a relatively
broad definition of disability and therefore understates the marginality of people
with more severe disabilities, suggest that only 46 per cent of people with disabilities
were employed full-time for the full year in 2004, compared to 65 per cent of people
without disabilities. While this reflects an increase from 42 per cent in 1999, 9 the
numbers nevertheless indicate the persistent marginal position that many people
with disabilities occupy in the labour market.
Interestingly, even though the federal Employment Equity Act includes people with
disabilities as a designated group,10 little progress has in fact been made in the em-
ployment rates of people with disabilities. 11 For the most recent available year, 2006,
the representation of people with disabilities in both the federally regulated private
sector and federal public sector remained significantly below market availability of
5. Canada, Advancing the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2004 (Ottawa: Social Development Can-
ada, 2004) at 38 (noting people with disabilities who rely primarily on employment income earn on
average $22,000 more than people with disabilities who rely primarily on income support programs).
6. See generally Vicki Schultz, "Life's Work" (2000) 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881.
7. Ibid. at 1886.
8. For good introductions to the voluminous literature on this topic, see Joanne Conaghan, Richard M.
Fischl & Karl Klare, eds., Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possi-
bilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Mark P. Thomas, Regulating Flexibility: The Political
Economy of Employment Standards (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009);
Leah Vosko, ed., Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada (Mon-
treal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).
9. Canada, Advancing the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2006 (Ottawa: Human Resources and So-
cial Development Canada, 2006) at 48, online: <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/engldisability-issues/reports/
fdr/2006/advancinginclusion.pdf>.
10. S.C. 1995, c. 44, s. 3.
11. Employment Equity Act: Annual Report 2007 (Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada,
2008) at 17, online: <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/publications/equality/annual-reports/2007/
pdf/2007_report.pdf>. The EEA applies to the federally regulated private sector and Crown corpora-
tions with 100 or more employees, the federal public service, separate employers in the federal public
service with 100 or more employees (such as the Canada Revenue Agency), other public sector em-
ployers with 100 or more employees (such as the Canadian Forces), and federal contractors with 100 or
more employees who bid on or receive contracts valued at more than $200,000. Ibid. at 2.
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employees with disabilities. 12 However, there were occasional bright spots, including
representation in the more narrowly defined federal public service at above-market
availability of employees with disabilities and increased representation of workers
with disabilities in the banking sector.
13
Moreover, the intersection of factors such as gender, age and Aboriginality remain
important. For instance, only 40 per cent of working-age women with disabilities
were employed in 2001, compared with 73 per cent of women without disabilities
(the comparable numbers for men were 48 per cent and 84 per cent respectively).
14
Older workers with disabilities, those with more severe disabilities and those with
lower educational levels are also less likely to be employed. 5 Aboriginal persons
not only face much higher rates of disability (particularly Aboriginal women) 16 but
Aboriginal workers with disabilities also experience heightened marginalization
in the labour market. Only 41 per cent of Aboriginal adults with disabilities were
employed, according to 2001 census data. Aboriginal adults with disabilities were
especially unlikely to be working full-time throughout the year. Only 21 per cent
of Aboriginal adults with disabilities were in this category, according to the 2001
data. 
17
Comparing income levels also provides some insight into the marginalization of
Canadians with disabilities. just as Canadians with disabilities are more likely to be
unemployed, Canadians with disabilities also experience higher poverty rates than
their able-bodied counterparts. According to Statistics Canada data, people with dis-
abilities are more than twice as likely to live below the Low-Income Cutoff.18 Given
the relatively weak labour market attachment of Canadians with disabilities and the
extra costs that disability often entails, this figure is hardly surprising. In addition
to unemployment, another cause of poverty for people with disabilities is that they
12. Ibid. at 17.
13. Ibid.
14. Advancing the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2006, supra note 9 at 56 (citing data from Statistics
Canadds 2001 Participation and Activity Limitations Survey).
15. Advancing the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2004, supra note 5 at 40.
16. Advancing the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2008, supra note 4 at 95: "It is clear that the rates of
disability-particularly associated with various health conditions such as diabetes and ear disease-
are distressingly high among Aboriginal peoples. Depending on the disability and the region under
consideration, estimates range from 20% to 50% greater than those found in the non-Aboriginal popu-
lation ... [a 2002-2003 survey] shows that the rate of disability among First Nations adults is 28.5%
(25.7% among men and 31.5% among women)".
17. Advancing the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2004, supra note 5 at 45. See also the similar data
reported at Advancing the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2006, supra note 9 at 56: "First Nations
adults with disabilities are less likely to be employed than their non-disabled counterparts (37.3% com-
pared to 52.2%)"
18. Advancing the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2004, ibid. at 54. See also Christine Dobby, "Whose
Responsibility? Disabled Adult 'Children of the Marriage' under the Divorce Act and the Canadian
Social Welfare State" (2005) 20 Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 41 at 47.
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are more likely to live alone than able-bodied people.' 9 Unfortunately, studies have
shown that concerns over loss of supplementary health coverage are an important
factor in discouraging people with disabilities from entering the labour market.20
People with disabilities are also twice as likely as able-bodied people to face food
shortages-a statistic that of course directly affects health.2' Primary income earners
with disabilities have also been found to have a net worth that is approximately one-
third of those without disabilities.22 Thus, a wide variety of measures of income find
people with disabilities repeatedly scoring poorly.
There is a well-established correlation between educational levels and success in the
labour market. In fact, this may increasingly be the case as a larger proportion of
newly created jobs require higher levels of training.23 Therefore, an examination of
differences among people with disabilities in educational attainment is important.
The data indicate that Canadians with disabilities are less likely to have completed
high school than their able-bodied counterparts. Some 37 per cent of adults with
disabilities have not completed high school, compared with only 25 per cent of able-
bodied adults.24 Similarly, people without disabilities are nearly twice as likely to
have completed a university degree as their counterparts with disabilities.2
5
The United States
Americans with disabilities also face strikingly similar economic marginalization.
According to data released in 2004 by the National Organization on Disability [NOD],
only 35 per cent of working-age Americans with disabilities were in the labour mar-
ket, full time or part time, compared with 78 per cent of able-bodied Americans.26
Moreover, according to 2000 data from the United States Census Bureau, only
19. Advancing the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2004, supra note 5 at 55.
20. Ibid. at 56.
21. Ibid. at 57.
22. Ibid. at 57-58. Interestingly, however, people with disabilities who have a post-secondary education
have a greater net worth than their counterparts without disabilities.
23. Ibid. at 31 (noting more than 70% of new jobs created in Canada in 2004 required a post-secondary
education).
24. Ibid. at 32.
25. Ibid.
26. 2004 National Organization on Disability / Harris Survey on Americans with Disabilities (Washington:
National Organization on Disability, 2004), summary available at <http://www.nod.org/Resources/
harris2004/harris2004_summ.pdf>. The latest data from the U.S. Census Bureau's monthly Current
Population Survey (CPS) indicates that the January 2009 labour participation rates of working-age
persons with and without disabilities remain at levels similar to those reported in the 2004 NOD/Har-
ris Survey. The monthly CPS data can be found at <http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsdisability.htm>. See also
Armantine M. Smith, "Persons with Disabilities as a Social and Economic Underclass" (2002-2003) 12
Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 13 at 21 for a summary of the data in the 2000 NOD/Harris Survey and the 2000
CPS.
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22 per cent of working-age men with disabilities were employed full-time.27 Not
surprisingly, women with disabilities and people with severe disabilities fared even
worse. In 2000, 27 per cent of working-age women with disabilities participated in
the labour market.28 Only a shockingly low 15 per cent of women with disabilities
were employed full time and only 9 per cent of those classified as severely disabled
were working at all.29 Again, it is important to emphasize that these statistics are
intended to supply only a portrait of the marginalization of American workers with
disabilities, rather than to make direct comparisons with the Canadian data, which
inevitably used different definitions of disability.
While income levels of workers with disabilities, as measured by mean earnings,
increased year after year in the late 1990s, income levels of people with disabilities
remained low. According to the 2007 Disability Status Report, based on census data,
people with disabilities were more than twice as likely as able-bodied people to have
incomes classified as low.30 The likelihood of having a low income was even greater
among people with physical and mental disabilities. 31 Eligibility criteria for income
support programs such as disability insurance are highly restrictive, and few people
with disabilities qualify because recipients are required to refrain from participation
in the labour market.32 People with severe disabilities tended to have particularly low
incomes, and the actual effect of this disparity is sharply magnified because people
with severe disabilities frequently have very large expenses related to their disabil-
ities, particularly in the free market health-care environment in the United States.33
Many scholars have justifiably identified the lack of a universal health-care program
as a major factor in keeping Americans with disabilities outside the labour market,34
where they remain eligible for Medicaid health benefits that are provided only to the
27. Smith, ibid. at 22 and 48, table 8 (summarizing data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey, 2000).
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid. at 22, 48 (table 8) and 54 (table 14).
30. W. Erickson & C. Lee, 2007 Disability Status Report: United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Rehabilitation Research and Training Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics, 2008) at 34
[Erickson & Lee, Disability Status], available online at <http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/edi/disabiitysta-
tistics/StatusReports/2007-PDF/2007-StatusReportUS.pdPCFID=995928 1&CFTOKEN=63943738
&jsessionid=f03042e2d15af7ab94781bld76433d255777>. See also ibid. at 22, citing the U.S. Census
Bureau Survey of Income and Program Participation, table 8A (1994-1995). See also Mark C. Weber,
"The Americans with Disabilities Act and Employment: A Non-Retrospective" (2000-2001) 52 Ala. L.
Rev. 375 at 416, n. 301 [Weber, "Americans"], citing data showing that the poverty rate for adults with
disabilities is three times that of the rest of the population.
31. Erickson & Lee, ibid. at 34-35. See also Smith, supra note 26 at 22.
32. Mark C. Weber, "Disability Rights, Disability Discrimination, and Social Insurance" (2009) 25 Ga. St.
U.L. Rev. 575 at 660.
33. Smith, supra note 26.
34. Samuel R. Bagenstos, "The Future of Disability Law" (2004) 114 Yale L.J. 1 at 71-72 (noting universal
entitlement programs are politically more stable than targeted policy interventions).
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extremely poor and are consequently especially vulnerable to cutbacks. According
to the 2007 Disability Status Report, the median earnings of people with disabilities
were significantly less than 80 per cent of people without disabilities.35 Again, like in
the Canadian case, it is hardly surprising that a segment of the population with min-
imal labour market attachment tends to have systematically low incomes. It is also
not surprising that income levels are directly correlated with educational attainment
levels among Americans with disabilities.
36
Again on the issue of educational attainment, Americans with disabilities remain far
behind their able-bodied peers. The NOD/Harris Survey data found that people with
disabilities were more than twice as likely as their able-bodied counterparts to have
not completed high school. More than 20 per cent of people with disabilities reported
that they had not attained a high school diploma.37 One interesting point to bear in
mind, however, is that most people with disabilities acquire their disabilities later in
life. Therefore, one has to consider not only factors such as physical barriers at uni-
versity and college campuses or the increasing costs of tuition but also the possibility
that disability is simply more common among those with lower levels of education
and income. 38 Regardless of the nature of the causal relationship, the fact remains
that people with disabilities in the United States have lower levels of educational at-
tainment, with significant implications for income levels and employment rates.
BARRIERS FACED BY PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
Canada
The discussion above made clear that Canadians with disabilities score poorly on key
indicators of socio-economic status. In this subsection, I illustrate major barriers in
Canadian society that collectively cause this profound marginalization. I do the same
in the subsequent subsection for the United States. This commentary is deliberately
selective, as the intent is not to provide a comprehensive discussion of every barrier
affecting Canadians with myriad diverse disabilities but merely to highlight particu-
larly difficult areas.
Transportation Barriers
Clearly, one critical area is transportation because effective public transportation is
essential for many people with disabilities, especially those with lower incomes, to
access employment, recreation and medical services in the community. This area
35. Erickson & Lee, supra note 30 at 31. See also Smith, supra note 26 at 22 (men aged twenty-one to
sixty-four years with no disabilities had a median monthly income of $2,353, while men with severe
disabilities in the same age range had a median monthly income of $1,880; the similar numbers for
women were $1,750 and $1,400 respectively).
36. Ibid. at 21.
37. Ibid. at 21, 58.
38. Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, "The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Part
III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?" (2000) 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 271 at 285, n. 78.
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encompasses all forms of transportation, including local and intercity buses, taxis,
trains, aircraft, ferries and ships. Barriers range from physical impediments to access
by people with mobility impairments, such as steps, to a failure to make information
on route stops available to blind people in alternative formats and beyond.
One illustration of these extensive barriers is the inaccessible railway cars operated
by VIA Rail that were the subject of an ultimately victorious battle waged by the
Transportation Committee of the Council of Canadians with Disabilities [CCD],
Canada's leading cross-disability rights-advocacy organization. In Via Rail Canada
Inc. v. Canada (Canadian Transportation Agency),39 the Supreme Court of Canada,
in a landmark opinion written by Justice Abella, upheld a decision of the Canadian
Transportation Agency ruling that features of the newly purchased Renaissance pas-
senger cars constituted undue obstacles to the mobility of people using wheelchairs
and people who require the assistance of service animals in violation of the Canada
Transportation Act [CTA].40 This issue was tremendously important because the
Renaissance cars represented the first addition of new trains to an inaccessible and
aging system in many years.
41
The Federal Court of Appeal had overturned the decision of the Agency, finding that
it had failed to analyze whether train users with disabilities could be accommodated
within the general train network as a whole, regardless of the physical barriers on the
Renaissance model.42 Moreover, the Federal Court of Appeal stated that the high cost
of accommodating a small number of passengers with disabilities has to be weighed
against the goal of keeping train fares affordable to the public.43 The Federal Court
of Appeal therefore found the Agency's decision to be patently unreasonable and
sent the issue back for reconsideration in accordance with its analysis. 44 Fortunately
for disability rights activists, a narrow 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
overturned the Federal Court of Appeal and restored the Agency's decision.
45
Justice Abella, writing for the majority, held that the CTA must be interpreted in
light of human rights principles,4 6 including respect for the dignity of travellers with
39. [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650 [Via Rail Canada].
40. S.C. 1996, c. 10.
41. David Baker & Sarah Godwin, "ALL ABOARD!: The Supreme Court of Canada Confirms That Cana-
dians with Disabilities Have Substantive Equality Rights" (2008) 71 Sask. L. Rev. 39 at 48. It should be
noted that David Baker and Sarah Godwin acted as legal counsel for the Council of Canadians with
Disabilities, the key player in this litigation. I also disclose that while this case predates my involve-
ment, I am now a member of the Human Rights Committee of the Council of Canadians with Dis-
abilities.
42. [2005] 4 F.C.R. 473, 2005 FCA 79 (QL) [Via Rail Canada cited to F.C.R.].
43. Ibid. at 512 (noting that only 0.5% of rail passengers in 1995 had disabilities).
44. Ibid. at 505-06.
45. Via Rail Canada, supra note 39.
46. Ibid. atparas. 112-17.
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disabilities. She stated that there is also a duty to prevent new barriers in the design
process and therefore the law does not require one to wait until inaccessible vehicles
are in operation and an individual has experienced discrimination.47 Furthermore,
given the informational disparity between a complainant and a corporate respondent
that has expertise about its own finances, the respondent had a duty to demonstrate
that removing the obstacle identified by the complainant would constitute undue
hardship.48 A finding would be made against a respondent that failed, as in this case,
to cooperate and provide evidence to the Agency.49 The Court also confirmed that
"undue obstacle" had to be interpreted as equivalent to "undue hardship" in Canadian
human rights jurisprudence, indicating that the very high standard imposed before
steps required to rectify a barrier are found to be an undue hardship apply to the
transportation arena as well.5" Undueness would be reached only when all reason-
able forms of accommodation were exhausted and rectifying the identified obstacle
would substantially interfere with the enterprise.5 1 Collectively, these principles mark
an important moment in Canadian jurisprudence.
The dissent, written jointly by Justice Rothstein and Justice Deschamps, placed far
more emphasis on the economic implications of mandating accommodation and held
that the Agency had erred in not giving sufficient weight to the degree of accessibility
offered on the general train network.52 The minority view, had it prevailed, would
have been a disturbing development in the jurisprudence that would have posed dif-
ficulties for future claimants alleging discrimination in the area of transportation
that requires a remedy involving capital expenditures.
Although the disability rights community ultimately scored an important if slender
victory in Via Rail Canada, the many years of struggle and activism that led to the
decision exemplify the significant barriers faced by people with disabilities. Indeed,
as David Baker and Sarah Godwin have commented, the lengthy litigation nearly
bankrupted the CCD.53 Moreover, during the many years that the complaint pro-
ceeded through the legal system, the inaccessible railway cars were operational, for-
cing people with mobility impairments to make alternative arrangements. As David
Baker has poignantly commented, "The recent VIA Rail incident is convincing
47. Ibid. at para. 118.
48. Ibid. at paras. 142, 226.
49. Ibid. at para. 226.
50. Ibid. at paras. 137-39.
51. Ibid. at paras. 130-31.
52. Ibid. at para. 351. I discuss the dissent briefly in Ravi Malhotra, "The Law and Economics Tradition
and Workers with Disabilities" (2007-2008) 39 Ottawa L. Rev. 249 at 278-79.
53. Baker & Godwin, supra note 41 at para. 1.
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evidence that Canada has become a dumping ground for inaccessible transportation
vehicles that cannot be brought into service in other developed countries
54
The decision in Via Rail, however, is by no means an isolated example. Although
some attention was paid to making transportation accessible-largely an issue within
federal jurisdiction-after the federal government released the Obstacles report in
1981 detailing systemic failures in the accommodation of people with disabilities in
many areas of life, 55 transportation policy in Canada remains filled with many bar-
riers for people with disabilities. Despite progress in the 1980s, a decision to make
accessibility standards voluntary by the Liberal government in 1993 has put Canada
now far behind many industrialized countries, including the United States.56 Despite
promises by private sector entities that voluntary accessibility codes would be ef-
fective, VIA Rail's intransigence in purchasing passenger cars that have significant
accessibility problems for people with mobility impairments is indicative of the bar-
riers that people with disabilities have faced when travelling.
57
Two other recent legal developments warrant careful attention. Recently, the Canadian
Transportation Agency ruled that people with disabilities who require an additional
seat for an attendant or because of obesity during flights must not be charged an
additional fare by the leading airlines.58 The Agency adopted the principle known
to disability rights activists as "One Person, One Fare'" The Agency accepted that
the previous policy of the airlines imposed financial burdens that constituted undue
obstacles for people with disabilities who required an extra seat during flights. The
policy made it difficult for people with disabilities to take advantage of the employ-
ment, leisure and educational opportunities that were otherwise available to airline
passengers.59 However, the Agency granted the airlines a one-year grace period to
implement a policy that complied with the ruling.
60
54. David Baker, Moving Backwards: Canada's State of Transportation Accessibility in an International Con-
text (Winnipeg: Council of Canadians with Disabilities, 2005) at 12-13 [Baker, Moving], online: Council
of Canadians with Disabilities <http://www.ccdonline.ca/en/transportation/minister/movingback>.
55. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Special Committee on the Disabled and the Handicapped,
Obstacles (Ottawa, 1981). Excerpted in Anne Crichton & Lyn Jongbloed, Disability and Social Policy in
Canada (North York: Captus, 1998) at 274.
56. Baker, Moving, supra note 54 at 2-3.
57. Ibid. at 3. The victory at the Supreme Court of Canada cannot make up for the years of inaccessibility
and barriers imposed on people with disabilities, especially poor people with disabilities who may not
be able to afford more expensive modes of transportation such as airplane flights.
58. Decision No. 6-AT-A-2008 (CTA) (available online at <http://www.otc-cta.gc.ca/decision-ruling/
decision-ruling.php?type=d&no-num=6-AT-A-2008&lang=eng>). The airlines involved included Air
Canada, Air Canada jazz, and Westjet.
59. Ibid at paras. 22, 163, and 903.
60. Ibid at para. 919. The ruling came into effect on 10 January 2009, after an application by the airlines
for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Federal Court of Appeal ([2008] EC.J. No. 209) and by the
Supreme Court of Canada ([2008] S.C.C.A. No. 322).
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A second issue of concern is the growing backlash to the Ontario Human Rights
Tribunal's rulings that municipal bus systems must announce the stops for blind pas-
sengers. As a result of successful complaints by prominent disability rights activists
in Toronto and Ottawa against their respective municipal transportation systems,61
the Ontario Human Rights Commission advised municipalities that they must call
out the stops. 62 In an unprecedented move, municipal councillors in Sarnia de-
nounced this directive in highly inflammatory language and compared the OHRC to
Nazis.63 This suggests that enforcement of the OHRC's commitment to calling out
the stops across Ontario in coming years will be challenging. The OHRC announced
in October 2008 that all thirty-eight of Ontario's public transit providers had com-
mitted to abiding by the stop announcement policy and that it would "continue to
monitor the situation ... to ensure that this important accessibility measure is avail-
able province-wide'.
64
Numerous other examples of transportation barriers are easily catalogued. If one fo-
cuses on a single city, Toronto, Canadas largest metropolis, the problems that plague
the local transportation system with respect to wheelchair accessibility are manifold.
They include the inaccessibility to wheelchair users and others with mobility im-
pairments of the major portion of the subway system-the main artery of Toronto's
transportation system.65 Even stations supposedly identified as wheelchair accessible
often experience broken elevators. On one random day when an accessibility audit
was conducted, more than a quarter of subway elevators were out of service and none
of the accessible subway stations even had accessible washrooms.66 Only one in four
buses in the conventional fixed-route bus fleet is wheelchair accessible. 67 The street-
car system is also completely inaccessible, even though accessible streetcar systems
61. Lepofsky v. TTC, 2007 HRTO 23; Green v. OC Transpo, Decision No. 200-AT-MV-2007 (CTA) (avail-
able online at <http://www.otc-cta.gc.ca/decision-ruhing/decision-ruling.php?type=d&no-num=200-
AT-MV-2007&lang=eng>). The complaint against Ottawa's OC Transpo system, which regularly
crosses into Quebec, was heard by the Canadian Transportation Agency. Both Lepofsky and Green are
members of the Ontario Bar and disability rights advocates.
62. See Commissioner Barbara Hall to transit providers, October 2007, online: Ontario Human Rights
Commission <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/resources/news/transitletter>. See also Ontario Human
Rights Commission, "Next Stop, Accessiblity": Report on Public Transit Stop Announcements in On-
tario (April 2008), online: Ontario Human Rights Commission <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/resourcesl
discussion consultation/transitreport/pdf>.
63. See AODA Affiance, "Our Campaign for Strong, Effective Implementation of the AODA online:
<http://www.aodaaUiance.org/strong-effective-aoda/03252008.asp>.
64. News Release, "RE: Transit Stop Announcements" (16 October 2008), online: Ontario Human Rights
Commission <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/resources/news/transitthank>.
65. Baker, Moving, supra note 54 at 35.
66. Ibid. at 42.
67. Ibid. at 40. In fairness, it should be noted that the Canadian disability rights community was less active
on the issue of making regular buses accessible because of concerns, now seen to be largely unfounded,
that heavy snowfall in most Canadian cities would prevent the use of such lifts.
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are in operation in European cities.68 Moreover, as a result of a 1998 decision by the
Conservative provincial government to download funding responsibilities for public
transit to municipalities, the paratransit service in Toronto that provides door-to-
door transportation, Wheel-Trans, has become increasingly costly and overwhelmed
by users, leading to a decline in the quality of the service and pressure by the ser-
vice provider to exclude those with mobility impairments that are deemed minor.
69
Lengthy waiting times, limited hours of service, advance booking requirements,
prioritization of trips for medical purposes only, cancellation fees and higher fares
are all growing problems with paratransit systems in Ontario.70 Collectively, these
barriers make employment for people with many disabilities very difficult.
Attendant Care Services
A second area that imposes considerable barriers for many people with disabilities is
the profound shortage of attendant care services, sometimes known as home support
services. Attendant service providers assist, under the direction of the disabled per-
son, with activities of daily living such as bathing, dressing and toileting and are es-
sential for people with disabilities to fully participate in employment, education and
life of the community in general. They allow people with disabilities to exercise full
autonomy in deciding to undertake particular tasks, such as putting on a blue shirt
or blouse on Monday, but leave the physical execution of the task to attendants to
perform.71 Unfortunately, demand for attendant care services in Canada greatly ex-
ceeds the supply, particularly in remote and rural communities, and the waiting lists
are often lengthy. Where such services are unavailable, people with disabilities are
expected to rely on demeaning institutional settings or family members or friends-
an untenable situation that undermines the independence of people with disabilities
and leads to friction or even abuse within families.72 Some people with disabilities
are forced to use acute health care services, a system already under extreme stress
and under-funded, because they have no alternative.
73
68. Ibid. at 41.
69. Ibid at 37-38; Ena Chadha, "Running on Empty: The 'Not So Special Status' of Paratransit Services in
Ontario" (2005) 20 Windsor Rev. Legal & Soc. Issues 1 at 9-10. Indeed, Wheel-Trans actually imple-
ments what amounts to a medical exam for new Wheel-Trans applicants to ensure that they are suf-
ficiently disabled. Chadha, ibid. at 10. The policy was unsuccessfully challenged as a violation of the
Charter equality rights of the mentally disabled: see Canella v. TTC., (1999) 123 O.A.C. 123 (Ont.
S.C.J.).
70. Chadha, ibid. at 1.
71. See the discussion of the difference between "decisional" and "executional" autonomy in Samuel R.
Bagenstos, "The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform" (2003) 44 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 921
at 992-93 [Bagenstos, "Americans"].
72. See Andrew I. Batavia, "A Right to Personal Assistance Services: 'Most Integrated Setting Appropriate'
Requirements and the Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care" (2001) 27 Am. J.L. & Med. 17 at
18 [Batavia, "Right"] (discussing implications of lack of attendant services in American context).
73. Roeher Institute, Nothing Personal: The Need for Personal Supports in Canada (North York. Roeher
Institute, 1993) at 64-65 [Roeher Institute, Nothing Personal].
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Moreover, these services are arbitrarily classified as extended health care under the
Canada Health Act and therefore provinces are free to impose user fees for them,
even though they are in fact essential for people with disabilities to thrive in the
community.74 Indeed, many provinces have imposed user fees, forcing many people
with disabilities on limited incomes to make drastic choices, such as bathing less
frequently-decisions that can have very negative health effects, physically and
psychologically.75 The same problems arise in provision of assistive devices such as
customized wheelchairs. There is also an extremely complex and highly bureaucratic
patchwork of services to navigate in order to obtain what is required, which varies
significantly from province to province and even within provinces. 76 There are also
concerns that the shift toward a decentralized federalism with greater powers for the
provinces, symbolized by the end of the Canada Assistance Plan, may mean greater
inter-provincial and intra-provincial disparities in the availability of attendant ser-
vices and assistive devices, as well as greater variation in eligibility requirements
and the degree of coverage. 77 This is particularly true as people with disabilities are
expected to rely increasingly on dispersed and local voluntary community organiza-
tions to supply services such as attendant services and assistive devices as the fed-
eral and provincial governments cede more and more authority to the community
support sector. There are also deep concerns that, despite federal government verbal
commitments to empowering Canadians, these voluntary organizations are far more
oriented towards satisfying their funders than the disabled clients who seek account-
ability for the services they obtain.
78
In many cases, there are also arbitrary disparities based on the medical diagnosis of
the disabled person, even though the individual may have needs identical to some-
one with a diagnosis for whom the program is intended.7 9 People who are born with
disabilities may find they do not meet the eligibility criteria of services designed for
people who are injured later in life and who have established a record ofemployment. °
74. Ibid. at 65.
75. Kari Krogh et al., A National Snapshot of Home Support from the Consumer Perspective: Enabling People
with Disabilities to Participate in Policy Analysis and Community Development (Winnipeg: Council of
Canadians with Disabilities, 2005) at 60, online: Council of Canadians with Disabilities <http://www.
ccdonline.ca/en/socialpolicy/disabilitysupports/homesupports/nationa-snapshot2005>.
76. Roeher Institute, Nothing Personal, supra note 73 at 70-71.
77. Roy Hanes & Allan Moscovitch, "Disability Supports and Services in the Social Union" in Alan Puttee,
ed., Federalism, Democracy and Disability Policy (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queer's University
Press, 2002) 121 at 131-32.
78. Michael Bach, "Governance Regimes in Disability-Related Policy and Programs: A Focus on Com-
munity Support Systems" in ibid., 153 at 160-61; Marcia H. Rioux & Michael J. Prince, "The Canadian
Political Landscape of Disability: Policy Perspectives, Social Status, Interest Groups and the Rights
Movement" in ibid., 11 at 24-25.
79. Roeher Institute, Nothing Personal, supra note 73 at 78-79 (describing Saskatchewan program that
funded wheelchairs only for people with paralysis).
80. Ibid. at 80.
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People with disabilities whose functioning is too great may ironically be at risk of
losing essential services. As the Roeher Institute has noted, "In short, a person has to
be careful about trying too hard for inclusion in the activities of everyday living for
fear of losing the supports that, for many, are essential to daily functioning.7
81
Even when people with disabilities qualify for attendant services, there are real prob-
lems of rigidity that risk profound marginalization. For instance, services may not
be available on weekends, drastically affecting a disabled person's quality of life.82
Programs may have strict regulations stipulating only home-based delivery of at-
tendant services, regardless of the fact that they are required in the workplace or at
a university, forcing the disabled person to apply separately to another program, if it
even exists, for the necessary services. 83 Even worse, many people with disabilities
may lose their services should they move, even within the same community, because
their attendant services are tied to a particular building.84 This situation obviously
has a direct effect on their labour market opportunities, including their ability to take
employment that requires travel.
Moreover, regulations may prohibit attendants from performing very simple care
routines-such as the insertion of tubes, which are easily learned by anyone-be-
cause they have been classified by legislation as funded only when performed by
a medical specialist. 85 Many consumers fear that the recent unionization of many
attendants may lead to restrictions that institutionalize their homes and dangerously
reduce flexibility, while destroying relationships between attendants and users. 86
Although some programs offer people with disabilities the opportunity to hire and
fire their own attendants under a direct funding model, these are available only on
a limited basis in many parts of Canada.8 7 Worst of all, funding cutbacks to home
support services in recent years have led to serious barriers that prevent people with
disabilities from achieving their full potential, including having to withdraw from
the labour market.
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84. Ibid; Krogh et al., supra note 75 at 59.
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Employees and Back Again? The Challenges of Organizing Personal-Care Workers in Ontario" in Cyn-
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"Empowering People with Disabilities" (2006) 41 New Politics, online: William Patterson University
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The United States
Transportation Barriers
It should be acknowledged at the outset that, despite myriad barriers for Americans
with disabilities, transportation accessibility has been a relative success story in the
United States. It remains clear, however, that all the same barriers that largely con-
tinue in Canadian transportation systems posed, in the past, the same difficulties for
Americans with disabilities and therefore warrant examination. Canadian disability-
rights advocates can learn much from the American history, and it is only by closely
parsing the interplay between legal doctrine and grassroots movements that one
can decipher what occurred to transform American society so radically in favour of
Americans with disabilities in the transportation sector.
For instance, as far back as 1976, when the disability rights movement was in its
relative infancy and more than a decade before the ADA, in Disabled in Action, Inc.
v. Coleman89 a coalition of disability rights activists sought to compel federal trans-
portation authorities to require manufacturers to produce a low-floor wide-door bus
with ramps that would be suitable for wheelchair users in order to meet accessibility
requirements in public transportation.9" Disability rights activists prioritized bus ac-
cessibility as a low-cost form of transportation for the many people with disabilities
with minimal incomes. 91 Although this litigation was deemed to be moot by the
time a decision was rendered, 92 the new Carter Administration, under pressure
from disability rights activists, reacted to the litigation by decreeing in 1977 that
all buses purchased with federal funds after 30 September 1979 must be wheelchair
accessible.93 Unfortunately, Congress, under intense pressure from lobbyists of the
American Public Transit Association [APTA], voted in 1978 to re-evaluate this man-
date, leading to delays of many years before Americans with disabilities would enjoy
full access to bus transportation.
94
This was by no means the only legal setback in these early days of American trans-
portation activism. In a telling ruling that would anticipate later dubious judicial
analyses of the ADA, a majority of the New York State Supreme Court (Appellate
Division) held that the New York City transit authorities did not discriminate against
people with physical disabilities under the state's human rights laws, because bus
lin, eds., Critical Disability Theory: Essays in Philosophy, Politics, Policy and Law (Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press, 2006) 151 at 151-76.
89. 448 F. Supp. 109, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18976 (E.D. Pa.1978) [Disabled cited to Lexis]. Although the
decision was released in 1978, the plaintiffs had filed the case in 1976.
90. Doris Zames Fleischer & Frieda Zames, The Disability Rights Movement: From Charity to Confronta-
tion (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001) at 56.
91. Ibid. at 85.
92. Disabled, supra note 89 at 5.
93. Fleischer & Zames, supra note 90 at 56.
94. Ibid.
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lifts that enabled wheelchair access were affirmative action and not mandated under
the law.95 Even when disability rights activists convinced authorities to introduce
some accessible buses, poor training for bus drivers meant that many did not know
how to use the wheelchair lifts or were hostile to people with mobility impairments
using the new buses, leading to confrontations between bus drivers and disability
rights activists.96 Poor maintenance of wheelchair lifts caused further difficulties.97
One early grassroots organization, Disabled in Action, organized a sit-in at the of-
fices of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority in Manhattan in 1980 to protest
continued delays in the introduction of wheelchair-accessible buses.98 In part, this
reflects the fact that a generation of radicalized veterans, newly disabled as a result of
combat in Vietnam, played a pivotal role in mobilizing Americans with disabilities
in transportation and other forms of activism.99 Tragically, this kind of grassroots
mobilization has been essentially absent from the Canadian scene.
Sometimes industry lobbyists initiated litigation in an effort to roll back or delay the
advent of disability rights. For instance, the APTA successfully launched litigation
to challenge 1979 Department of Transportation [DOT] regulations that required
accessible buses. APTA was able to convince the D.C. Circuit that accommoda-
tion of people with disabilities wrongly constituted unwarranted affirmative ac-
tion and therefore the Court overturned a lower court's ruling upholding the DOT
regulations. 100 The New York City government under Mayor Koch was particularly
hostile to accessible transportation, citing the cost implications at a time of fiscal
constraints for municipal governments. Nevertheless, a 1984 agreement between
transit authorities and disability rights activists generated an eight-year plan to make
key subway stations and a large majority of buses wheelchair accessible. Eventually,
transit authorities agreed to make all buses wheelchair accessible. 10 1 Organizations
such as American Disabled for Accessible Public Transportation [ADAPT] battled
on with an array of lawsuits in the courts and political demonstrations in the streets
throughout the 1980s. This action culminated eventually in attainment of nation-
wide transportation accessibility and the passage of the ADA. The history of this
struggle provides important lessons from which Canadian disability rights activists
can learn.
10 2
95. Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 433 N.Y.S. 2d 461
(App. Div. 1980).
96. Fleischer & Zames, supra note 90 at 60-61.
97. Ibid. at 61.
98. Ibid. at 59.
99. See Ravi Malhotra, "The Politics of the Disability Rights Movement" (2001) 31 New Politics, online:
William Patterson University <http://www.wpunj.edu/newpol/issue31/malhot31.htm>.
100. American Public Transit Association v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
101. Fleischer & Zames, supra note 90 at 62.
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What are the specific lessons for Canadian disability rights activists? First and fore-
most, one should not be choosing between political-consciousness-raising and the
assertion of disability rights as a political issue in every realm of the public sphere,
on the one hand, and a litigation strategy on the other. Rather, the two should be
complementary and go hand in hand. 103 This suggests that a disability rights move-
ment led primarily by professionals needs to liaise more aggressively with marginal-
ized segments of the community who have both the time and passion to contribute
in a way that many professionals with disabilities do not. While the Vietnam war was
a unique episode in American history, activism can be replicated, provided that ad-
vocacy organizations conduct the proper outreach. The vast majority of people with
disabilities still do not self-identify with the movement in Canada. A second ques-
tion that remains ambiguous is the role that injured soldiers returning from service
in Afghanistan might play in a future disability rights movement. Very little is known
about such disabled soldiers, and while one cannot equate their experiences with the
explosive political tensions raised by American intervention in Vietnam, it is entirely
possible that newly disabled soldiers will become politicized in a way that has been
sorely lacking among many people with disabilities.
Attendant Services
The historic lack of attendant services has also been an enormous barrier for more
than ten million Americans with disabilities, and success has remained more elusive
than in the field of transportation. A major political issue in the United States has
been the continued warehousing of people with disabilities in nursing homes, despite
the very real potential they have to live independently and contribute to society if ap-
propriate attendant services were made available and despite the fact that attendant
services are actually more cost effective. 104 Neglect and abuse in American nurs-
ing homes are legendary and the settings are particularly inappropriate for younger
people with disabilities. 10 5 Some people with disabilities have even committed sui-
cide rather than be confined to the bleak regimentation of a nursing home.1
0 6
While the Independent Living movement has highlighted this issue and in some
cases has even become a provider of attendant services to disabled people through
disabled-run Independent Living Centres, most Americans with disabilities con-
tinue to obtain attendant services through home health agencies with many of the
103. This dovetails with the findings of Sarah Armstrong's insightful work on the impact of litigation strate-
gies on disability rights movements. See generally Sarah Armstrong, "Disability Advocacy in the Char-
ter Era" (2003) 2 J.L. & Equality 33.
104. Fleischer & Zames, supra note 90 at 84.
105. See generally Nina A. Kohn, "Second Childhood: What Child Protection Systems Can Teach Elder
Protection Systems" (2003) 14 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev 175; Margo Schlanger, "Beyond the Hero Judge:
Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation" (1999) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1994 at 2035, n. 184 (discussing
litigation against nursing homes).
106. Fleischer & Zames, supra note 90 at 34-35.
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same problems and restrictions that I discussed above in the Canadian context. 10 7
Consequently, there are real needs that still have to be addressed and a powerful $90
billion nursing home industry stands much to lose. 10 8 It is telling and indicative of
a fundamental problem that the American activist organization ADAPT eventually
changed the meaning of its acronym to American Disabled for Attendant Programs
Today in 1990 to reflect its continuing struggle for attendant services long after it had
won its battles for accessible public transportation.
10 9
The first significant reform was enactment by Congress of section 1915(c) of the
Social Security Act in 1981. This established an optional service entitled the Home
and Community-Based Care Waiver Program that authorized the provision of ser-
vices in the community.110 Participating states could apply for a certain number of
waiver slots, provided that the cost of offering services in the community would
be less expensive. Individuals who met the financial eligibility criteria could then
choose whether they obtained community based services, but only until the slots
were filled."' States retained considerable autonomy to decide whether to offer such
services state-wide, how many slots to request and whether to offer them to people
with specific types of disabilities. 112 While the amount spent has risen markedly
since the late 1980s, it still pales in comparison to the tens of billions allocated for
institutional care and primarily serves younger people with physical or intellectual
disabilities.113
Disability rights activists have continued to mobilize on the issue. ADAPT played
a major role in creating awareness of the issue using the same highly creative and
effective methods that it had used to challenge the inaccessibility of the intercity
bus industry. For instance, it has surrounded government buildings as well as offices
of lobbying organizations for the nursing home industry in various cities and then
proclaimed the building to be a nursing home. People were then allowed to enter or
leave the occupied buildings only with ADAPT's permission. 114 Such aggressive tac-
tics likely contributed to public awareness and influenced the outcome of litigation
107. Bob Kafka, "Empowering Service Delivery" (1998) Ragged Edge, online: <http://www.raggededge-
magazine.com/0998/b998ft6.htm>. For a discussion of the Independent Living movement, see Marc
A. Rodwin, "Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical Consumerism and the
Patients' Rights, Women's Health and Disability Rights Movements" (1994) 20 Am. J.L. & Med. 147 at
164-66.
108. Fleischer & Zames, supra note 90 at 83-84.
109. Ibid. at 82, 104-05.
110. Batavia, "Right", supra note 72 at 24.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid. at 25.
114. Fleischer & Zames, supra note 90 at 84.
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in this area. 115 For example, in Olmstead v. L.C.,116 a majority of the Supreme Court
ruled that the unnecessary institutionalization of people with mental health and in-
tellectual disabilities in Georgia could in some circumstances violate the ADA where
reasonable accommodations were not made that permitted such individuals to live in
the most integrated possible setting. 117 The majority found that unjustified isolation
may be regarded as discrimination under the ADA. Therefore, the Court held that,
when evaluating such claims by people with disabilities, and arguments by states that
accommodations would constitute a fundamental alteration of the program, courts
must consider both the cost of providing community care by the plaintiffs in question
and the range of services that the state provides to people with mental disabilities and
the need to offer all services equitably." 8 In many ways, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Olmstead marked a turning point in favour of the Independent Living model
and consumer-directed care where the disabled person selects, manages and fires his
or her attendants. 119
Studies in the United States that have compared disabled people's satisfaction in
using an Independent Living [IL] model with the traditional agencies model have
shown significant advantages with the IL model.120 People with disabilities under the
IL model are generally much more satisfied with their attendants and also rate their
overall quality of life as higher. 121 Moreover, evidence supports a positive correlation
between the IL model and the health of people with disabilities. Studies have dem-
onstrated a lower hospitalization rate when disabled people use the IL model. 122
Disabled people using the IL model also have been able to achieve greater productiv-
ity, making it easier for them to participate in the labour market. 123 Unfortunately,
attendant services programs that follow the IL model remain limited, undermining
the capacities of many potential workers with disabilities in the United States.
DISABILITY RIGHTS LAWS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Canada
In this subsection, I provide a brief overview of leading Supreme Court of Canada
cases and arbitral decisions that affect workers with disabilities before discussing
115. Ibid. at 104-05.
116. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid. at 597.
119. Andrew I. Batavia, "The Growing Prominence of Independent Living and Consumer Direction as
Principles in Long-term Care: A Content Analysis and Implications for Elderly People with Disabili-
ties" (2002) 10 Elder L.J. 263 at 270-71 [Batavia, "Growing"].
120. Ibid. at 267.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid. at 268.
123. Ibid. at 269.
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American jurisprudence in the next subsection. In Canada, the duty to accommodate
workers with disabilities has its origins in the duty to accommodate workers with
religious beliefs and the development of jurisprudence under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability
and was adopted as part of the 1982 patriation of the Canadian Constitution.
124
In Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpson-Sears, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that a neutral workplace rule requiring a retail clerk to work
on her Sabbath violated the Ontario Human Rights Code's prohibition of discrimina-
tion on the basis of creed.125 The Supreme Court, overruling lower courts, held that
intent was not required to make a claim of discrimination, as the difficulties in dem-
onstrating intent would make it unlikely that a complainant could prove an intent to
discriminate on the part of employers in many cases. 
126
Moreover, human rights legislation seeks to remove discrimination to assist victims
rather than punish the party that is discriminating. 127 The Court also endorsed the
idea, later developed in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia128 , that equal
treatment did not necessarily require identical treatment. Furthermore, the Court
developed the point that human rights legislation is quasi-constitutional and almost
always takes priority over conflicting statutes. Human rights legislation clearly also
takes precedence over collective agreements and private contracts and must be inter-
preted in a broad and liberal fashion. 129
The Court therefore developed the concept of adverse effect discrimination, which
arises where a neutral rule is not discriminatory on its face but nevertheless has a
disproportionate effect on a group protected by human rights legislation. 130 In this
case, the neutral rule of performing work on a standard schedule had an adverse ef-
fect on particular religious minorities who could not work on their Sabbath. Once a
complainant had demonstrated primafacie evidence of adverse effect discrimination,
the employer had the onus of showing that the workplace rule constituted a bonafide
124. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [Charter
of Rights]. However, disability rights activists had to mobilize to convince the federal government to
amend the original version of the Charter of Rights, which did not bar disability discrimination. For
a discussion of this, see e.g. M. David Lepofsky, "The Charter's Guarantee of Equality to People with
Disabilities: How Well Is It Working?" (1998) 16 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 155 at 161-64. Section 15 of
the Charter of Rights did not take effect until 1985, to allow legislatures and others to adjust.
125. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, [1985] S.C.J. No. 74 (QL) [O'Malley cited to S.C.R.].
126. Ibid. at 549.
127. Ibid. at 547.
128. Andrews v. The Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 164, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6 (QL)
[Andrews cited to S.C.R.].
129. Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario Human Rights Commission [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321 at 339, (1992) 93 D.L.R.
(4th) 346 (QL); Michael MacNeil, Michael Lynk & Peter Engelmann, Trade Union Law in Canada,
looseleaf (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2002) 5 11.210.
130. O'Malley, supra note 125 at 551-52.
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occupational requirement [BFOR] that the employer could not alter or accommodate
without experiencing undue hardship. 131 As the employer in this case did not present
any evidence, the Court held that the employer had failed to demonstrate undue hard-
ship and found that its failure to accommodate violated the Ontario Human Rights
Code.132 The development of the concept of adverse effect discrimination allowed
for a more comprehensive understanding of the need to accommodate workers with
disabilities where many barriers relate to neutral rules of general application that
negatively affect workers with disabilities. By the late 1990s, disability discrimination
complaints were the most common ground of discrimination alleged before both the
Ontario and Canadian Human Rights Commissions.
133
In Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission),134 the Supreme
Court of Canada clarified the nature of the duty to accommodate in another case
concerning the accommodation of a worker's religious beliefs that conflicted with
workplace rules. The complainant worked at a milk processing plant and was denied
time off to celebrate a religious holiday that fell on a Monday, the busiest day at
the plant, and subsequently terminated after refusing to work on his Holy Day.135
Although a human rights Board of Inquiry upheld his discrimination complaint, this
decision was overturned on appeal on the grounds that the work schedule consti-
tuted a BFOR.' 3 6 The Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice Wilson, restored the
Commission's decision and held that the employer had violated the complainant's
human rights by failing to accommodate his request for time off to commemorate his
Holy Day up to the point of undue hardship. 137 There was a duty to accommodate
even where the employer argued that the workplace rule constitutes a BFOR.131 Until
this decision, the case law remained very confused, often making arbitrary distinc-
tions based on the wording of particular human rights statutes, on the question of
whether the duty to accommodate arises only in cases of adverse effect discrimina-
tion or whether it applied also to situations of direct discrimination. 139
131. Ibid. at 552, 555. This is sometimes known as the bona fide occupational qualification. In unionized
workplaces, the union also has a duty to accommodate.
132. Ibid. at 559-60.
133. Michael Lynk, "Disability and the Duty to Accommodate: An Arbitrator's Perspective" [2001-02] Lab.
Arb. Y.B. 51 at 56.
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135. Ibid. at 494-96.
136. Ibid. at 500.
137. Ibid. at 517.
138. Ibid. See also Ravi A. Malhotra, "The Legal Genealogy of the Duty to Accommodate American and
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14 [Malhotra, "Legal Genealogy"].
139. Lepofsky, supra note 124 at 178. See also Bhinder v. CN, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561, [1985] S.C.J. No. 75 (QL)
(holding workplace rule requiring worker to wear hard hat was a BFOR).
(2009) 22 Journal of Law and Social Policy
The ruling also clarified what the criteria are in determining the contours of when
an accommodation will be classified as undue hardship. The Court indicated that
while not an exhaustive list, six factors identified by the Board of Inquiry ought to
be adopted: (1) financial cost of the accommodation, (2) disruption of a collective
agreement, (3) problems of morale of other employees, (4) interchangeability of the
workforce and facilities, (5) size of the employer's operations and (6) safety.140 The
exact weight accorded to each factor varies with the facts of a particular case but
employee morale is generally accorded little weight.14 ' These principles have been
applied in a number of disability discrimination cases relevant to the workplace in
many different situations.
In British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U
(Meiorin),142 a case involving a female firefighter's challenge to aerobic standards'
as adverse effect discrimination that disproportionately affected female firefight-
ers, the Supreme Court of Canada restored the arbitrator's decision ruling that the
grievor had experienced discrimination. 143 This landmark decision also established
a new test that transcended the obscure differences between adverse effect and direct
discrimination and confusion over when the relevant tests for the two categories
applied.'" Under the new test, a decision maker has to ask three questions: (1) Did
the employer adopt the challenged standard for a purpose rationally connected to
the performance of the job? (2) Has the employer chosen the standard in an honest
and good faith belief that it is required to fulfil the work-related purpose? (3) Is the
standard reasonably necessary so that it would be impossible to accommodate an
individual employee without imposing undue hardship upon the employer?145 In or-
der to demonstrate undue hardship, the employer must pass all three branches of the
test. 146 As Lynk observes, the decision requires employers to reflect on a number of
factors when considering a possible accommodation. These factors include whether
alternative approaches, such as individualized testing, have been attempted or imple-
mented, whether a common standard for all employees is truly necessary, whether
the employer's business objectives may be met in a way that is not discriminatory,
whether the standard may be designed without placing a burden on those to whom
the standard applies and whether the union and the disabled employee have fully
participated in the process.
147
140. Dairy Pool, supra note 134 at 520-21.
141. Lynk, supra note 133 at 64-65.
142. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (QL) [Meiorin cited to S.C.R.].
143. Ibid.
144. See Colleen Sheppard, "Of Forest Fires and Systemic Discrimination: A Review of British Columbia
(Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U." Case Comment, (2001) 46 McGill L.J.
533 at 538-39.
145. Meiorin, supra note 142 at 32-33.
146. Ibid.
147. Lynk, supra note 133 at 60.
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Another important case meriting close attention is the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin. 148 In Martin, the
Court considered a section 15 Charter challenge to the exclusion of chronic pain
from the regular workers' compensation system in Nova Scotia. Unlike others with
disabilities who were eligible for workers' compensation, workers diagnosed with
chronic pain were eligible for only a four-week Functional Restoration Program. 149
The Court unanimously held that the exclusion of workers with chronic pain from
the regular workers' compensation system did in fact violate their equality rights
under the Charter and could not be saved by section 1.150 The Court noted that the
exclusion did not allow for the individual testing of workers who were asserting that
they had chronic pain.151 It determined that the appropriate comparator group-an
important prerequisite for successful section 15 Charter litigation-was all workers
eligible for employment-related injuries who do not have chronic pain. 152 The Court
skilfully acknowledged that the widespread perception among many policy-makers
and physicians that chronic fatigue syndrome was at least partly psychosomatic sim-
ply increased the stigma of people with the condition and enhanced, rather than
diminished, their legal argument.' 53 By explicitly stating that the legislation and
associated regulations harmed the dignity of Nova Scotians with chronic pain and
provided them with no services specifically geared toward chronic pain, the Court
contributed to a nuanced understanding of disability discrimination. 
154
This is not to suggest that there is not considerable room for improvement. Most
certainly there has been greater progress made in the unionized sector covered by
labour law than among the majority of non-unionized workers with disabilities, who
must rely solely on provincial employment standards legislation and the contract of
148. [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, 2003 SCC 54 [Martin cited to S.C.R.]
149. Ibid. at para. 2.
150. Ibid. at paras. 5-6. Much of the ruling deals with the extent to which administrative tribunals may
consider constitutional issues. That issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
151. Ibid. at para. 71.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid. at para. 90.
154. Ibid. at para. 101. This contrasts sharply with the Court's reasoning in Granovsky v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, 2000 SCC 28 (upholding dropout provision in
Canada Pension Plan eligibility requirement that prevented people with temporary disabilities from
obtaining CPP benefits). I write about this elsewhere: see Ravi Malhotra, "Martha Nussbaum's Capa-
bilities Approach and Equality Rights for People with Disabilities: Rethinking the Granovsky Decision"
in Joseph Magnet & Bernard Adell, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms at Twenty-Five
(Markham: LexisNexis, 2009) 61 at 61-89.
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employment. 155 Hence, in the recent decision of Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays,156 the
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, speaking through Justice Bastarache, held
that aggravated and punitive damages ought not to have been awarded to a man with
chronic fatigue syndrome [CFS] who had worked for his employer for some four-
teen years and who was now seeking damages for wrongful dismissal.'5 7 The trial
judge had increased the notice period of fifteen months to twenty-four months in
light of what he concluded was discrimination and harassment on the part of Honda
Canada. Additionally, punitive damages of $500,000 were awarded. 158 The majority
of the Ontario Court of Appeal reduced punitive damages to $100,000 because it
concluded that the trial judge had relied on findings of fact that were not supported
by evidence and because the damages were not proportional to the alleged wrong. 1
59
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the trial judge erred
in many of his factual findings and that there had not been discriminatory conduct
in the manner of Mr. Keays' dismissal. Consequently, they ruled that there was no
justification for either extending the notice period beyond fifteen months 160 or for
any punitive damages whatsoever.
16 1
On the one hand, it seems evident that the Supreme Court majority may not have
a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the complexities of an invisible disability
such as CFS, which is widely misunderstood by many policy-makers, including
physicians. It represents a departure from the reasoning in Martin. However, it
should also be acknowledged that a number of factors likely coalesced to produce
this outcome. First, the trial judge's inflammatory language about a Honda Canada
conspiracy against Mr. Keays likely undermined his reasons and indeed led to very
little deference to his findings of fact.1 62 In that sense, the decision can likely be
distinguished from future litigation of this sort. However, a more troubling aspect
is the fact that the majority seemed unwilling to systematically apply human rights
principles in adjudicating the conduct of the employer. 163 By insisting that there was
simply no basis to found a human rights complaint and that it was unnecessary to
155. See, e.g. Michael Lynk, "Disability and Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with
Disabilities in Canada" in The Honourable Randall S. Echlin & Chris G. Paliare, eds., Law Society of Up-
per Canada Special Lectures 2007: Employment Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 189 at 193-94, online:
Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid= 1068403>.
156. Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362, 2008 SCC 39 [Keays]. I disclose that I am a member of
the Human Rights Committee of the Council of Canadians with Disabilities that had intervener status
in this litigation.
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid. at paras. 8-11.
159. Ibid. at para. 18.
160. Ibid. at paras. 33-61.
161. Ibid. at paras. 62-78.
162. Ibid. at paras. 36-48. Justice Bastarache concluded, as did the Court of Appeal, that "there simply was
no conspiracy to terminate Keays" Ibid. at para. 45.
163. Ibid. at para. 67.
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consider whether discrimination constituted an independent actionable wrong, the
Supreme Court missed a golden opportunity to weave human rights principles into
wrongful dismissal jurisprudence.
Overall, the Canadian jurisprudence on disability has had a number of advantages.
First, it has accepted a very broad definition of disability. Whereas the American
ADA jurisprudence is fraught with difficulties, Canadian human rights tribunals and
labour arbitration boards have accepted the fact that disability includes not just the
stereotypical person using a wheelchair or who is blind or deaf but a wide range
of mental health disabilities such as depression, invisible disabilities such as HIV
and colour blindness, addictions such as alcoholism or drug dependency, and much
more. 164 A disability may be temporary, long-term or permanent. A person who is
perceived by employers as having a disability also qualifies as a person with a disabil-
ity. All these conditions must be accommodated up to the point of undue hardship.165
A second advantage is that labour arbitrators have gained the authority to apply hu-
man rights codes in arbitration, including of course the duty to accommodate. 166
This means that unionized workers are able to win remedies on a far more expedited
basis than would be possible by filing complaints with the backlogged and painfully
slow human rights commissions.
167
The scope of the duty to accommodate disabilities in Canadian arbitral and human
rights jurisprudence is broad and may require the employer to act creatively and flex-
ibly to implement the principles enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
in human rights legislation in highly specific and individual circumstances that must
be evaluated on their own merits. It includes the idea that existing positions may have
to be rebundled or modified, to the point of undue hardship, if a particular worker
cannot perform the duties in any existing job.168 An employer may also be required
to offer training, provided that the cost does not amount to undue hardship, for a
disabled employee. 169 Employers operating larger workplaces may have a concomi-
tantly broader duty to workers requesting accommodations such as, for instance,
other shifts. 170 However, this duty to accommodate disabilities is not unlimited. An
employer retains the right to operate a productive workplace, and an employee must
be able to perform the essential duties of an existing, modified or newly assigned
position. The duty to accommodate does not generally require the creation of an
164. Lynk, supra note 133 at 61-63.
165. Ibid.
166. Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.PS.E.U., Local 324, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157,
2003 SCC 42 (QL).
167. See e.g. Brian Etherington, "Promises, Promises: Notes on Diversity and Access to Justice" (2000) 26
Queen's L.J. 43.
168. Calgary District Hospital Group and U.N.A., Local 121-R (1994), 41 L.A.C. (4th) 319 at 326 (Ponak)
(suggesting nursing jobs may have to be rebundled to accommodate disabled grievor).
169. Lynk, supra note 133 at 72-73.
170. Ibid. at 72.
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entirely new position. 171 It consists largely of after-the-fact modification to existing
structures that systematically discriminate against people with disabilities.
Nevertheless, the Canadian approach provides for significant modifications of the
workplace to meet the individualized accommodation issues of specific disabled
people and its system of regulations to allow for disabled people to be reasonably
accommodated. In this respect, it contrasts favourably with the American experience
that I will analyze below. For instance, automatic termination clauses in a collective
agreement or in an employment contract have typically been found by arbitrators
and courts to violate human rights statutes. These provisions state that a worker
automatically loses her or his job following a prescribed period of absence, regard-
less of the reason. Decision makers have generally concluded that since disabilities
are the cause for the absence, termination essentially for having a disability amounts
to discrimination if the employee may be accommodated in another position or is
likely to return to work in the foreseeable future. 172 Arbitrators have also held that
an employer is still required to accommodate a worker whose disability is discovered
or identified only after she or he is terminated.
173
This is not to suggest that the duty to accommodate is unlimited. There will always
be cases that are extremely difficult to accommodate and where the employer cannot
be expected to do more. For instance, in Hydro-Quibec v. Syndicat des employees de
techniques professionnelles et de bureau d'Hydro-Qudbec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-
FTQ)174 the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that an arbitrator's rul-
ing, dismissing the employee's grievance with respect to her termination, that the
employer had met its duty to accommodate ought to be restored.'75 The grievor in
this case had numerous and diverse disabilities including episodes of depression and
personality disorder, physical impairments such as tendonitis, epicondylitis and bur-
sitis and also had undergone various surgeries. 176 She had missed 960 days of work
in fewer than eight years and the prognosis was clear that her psychiatric disabilities
would continue indefinitely.1
77
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the idea, developed in Meiorin, that a work-
place rule will be upheld only when it is impossible to accommodate an employee
without undue hardship, did not mean that the employer had to tolerate an employee
171. Ibid. at 76-77.
172. Ibid. at 81-83. But see McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des em-
ployis de l'H6pital gingral de Montrial, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161, 2007 SCC 4 [McGill] (ruling automatic
termination clauses do not necessarily violate an employer's human rights responsibilities to accom-
modate employees with disabilities per se where employee had been absent for a period of years).
173. Lynk, supra note 133 at 89.
174. [2008] 2 S.C.R. 561, 2008 SCC 43 [Hydro-Quebec].
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid. at para. 2.
177. Ibid. at paras. 3-5.
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who was hampering the efficient operation of the business. Rather, dismissal would
be seen as appropriate where the employer had made significant efforts to accommo-
date the employee. 178 In this case, the employer had undertaken significant efforts to
accommodate the grievor, including modification of her work station, part time work
and reassignment to a new position. 179 The Court also held that one must consider
the accommodations provided over the entire time of employment, not simply at the
time of dismissal. 180 While some may see this as a retreat in the application of dis-
ability rights law, the fact situation raised here is extreme and it is hardly surprising
that arbitrators and courts would regard any further accommodation as constituting
undue hardship. 181
With respect to last chance agreements, where employers and unions typically agree
that a further serious violation of work rules-usually significant absenteeism caused
by alcoholism or drug addiction-will result in automatic termination as an alterna-
tive to immediate discharge, the duty to accommodate disabilities contained in hu-
man rights law may sometimes override the last chance agreement. Neither employ-
ers nor unions are entitled to contract out of the human rights code. 182 Arbitrators
and courts have typically insisted that employers demonstrate that they cannot
accommodate the disabled worker, notwithstanding the breach of the last chance
agreement, without undue hardship. 183 An employer may, for instance, be expected
to allow a worker with an addiction problem to take a leave of absence in order to
enter drug rehabilitation.' 84 However, a worker may be dismissed if reasonable ac-
commodation has been made and there is no reasonable likelihood that the worker
will achieve regular attendance in the future. 185
Yet there is one telling contradiction that comparative scholarship reveals. Although
Canadian workplaces, particularly those that are unionized, must comply with a
significant duty to accommodate workers with disabilities up to the point of undue
hardship, this does little to address those environmental barriers, such as those
existing in the transportation system. It also does not address barriers in education
faced by the many people with disabilities who acquire disabilities at birth or prior to
entry into the labour market. Similarly, the broad definition of disability is undoubt-
edly extremely beneficial for those who acquire disabilities either in the workplace
or off-duty while they are employed. However, the broad definition of disability does
178. Ibid. at paras. 12-18. This seems to resolve ambiguity about what precisely the Supreme Court meant
by "impossible" in Meiorin, supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
179. Ibid. atpara. 17.
180. Ibid. at paras. 21-22.
181. In that sense, it is similar to the fact situation raised in McGill, supra note 172.
182. Lynk, supra note 133 at 98.
183. Ibid. at 94.
184. Ibid. at 95.
185. Ibid. at 98.
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not assist people with disabilities in battling bus systems and subway networks that
are not friendly for wheelchair users or those who require guide dogs and announced
stops. 186 The fact that American society has featured more vibrant and successful dis-
ability rights activism has meant that more significant gains have been made in areas
such as transportation access. Ranging from academic groups such as the Society
for Disability Studies to more activist oriented organizations such as ADAPT that
flaunt their in-your-face tactics, these dedicated advocates for disability rights activ-
ism have altered the discursive policy environment to make it much more difficult
for policy-makers to ignore disability activism.187 Indeed, recent American scholar-
ship has even focused on strategies for cultivating future generations of disability
leaders and identifying ways of obtaining representation of particularly marginalized
subgroups of people with disabilities, such as those with intellectual disabilities.
188
Canadians can learn much from these initiatives where their cognate equivalents
remain comparatively timid and where fewer Canadians with disabilities are willing
to publicly devote their time for disability rights causes.
Would such an approach dismiss the tried and true strategies of legal change for the
utopian pastures of political transformation? Not at all. As Orly Lobel has recently
observed, there is a risk of cooptation in both legal and non-legal strategies. 189 Legal
strategies may flatten more creative and rich methods of addressing a multifaceted
problem of discrimination. They may serve to legitimate struggling for legal reforms
in a system that is inherently unequal or they may crowd out other potentially more
liberating solutions.190 A purely political strategy runs the risk of itself being co-
opted by the popular discourses of the day such as privatization, deregulation and the
transfer of government functions to other non-state actors. 191 A dialectically inter-
connected legal and political strategy is necessary so that the day-to-day political
activism of disability rights activists feeds into the legal strategies of disability rights
lawyers and vice versa. Other social movements such as the feminist movement have
186. The recently enacted Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, S.O. 2005, c. 11, after about a
decade of tireless lobbying by disability rights activists, mandates improved access in the long term. It
is far too early to tell whether the AODA process will generate improvements in accessibility. This topic
will have to be assessed by future scholarship.
187. See Society for Disability Studies <http://www.disstudies.org> for an overview of the Society for Dis-
ability Studies' history and activities.
188. Pennie Foster-Fishman et al., "Building the Next Generation of Leaders in the Disabilities Movement"
(2007) 22 Disability & Soc. 341 at 347.
189. See generally Orly Lobel, "The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and
Transformative Politics" (2007) 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937.
190. Ibid. at 949-58. The seminal example in the field of labour law is Karl E. Klare, "Judicial Deradicaliza-
tion of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941" (1977) 62 Minn.
L. Rev. 265 (discussing how the passage of labour law legislation in the United States stunted the rank-
and-file consciousness of union activists). This is a brief summation of a very complex topic.
191. Ibid. at 942, 975.
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demonstrated a capacity for seeking political change and legal reforms. Both are
valuable and necessary.
In Canada, the duty to accommodate has been confined largely to the workplace in
terms of practical realization, as illustrated by the tenacious fight of the railway in-
dustry to block basic accessibility to mobility impaired Canadians that was achieved
long ago in the United States.192 Yet without substantive changes in areas such as
transportation and attendant services, people with disabilities will remain outside
the labour market. The relatively high union density rate in Canada, particularly in
the comparatively large and highly regulated public sector, 193 facilitates provision of
accommodations at labour arbitration. However, it is completely irrelevant to those
Canadians with disabilities who have either given up the quest for labour market
entry and the dignity of working for a living or never entered the labour market in
the first place. It will require both political strategizing and dramatic legal victories to
achieve the changes that Canadians with disabilities so badly need. I turn in the next
subsection to an overview of American jurisprudence under Title I of the ADA.
The United States
In 1990, the ADA was enacted by Congress with overwhelming support, with a
two-year phase-in period similar to the one granted for section 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, after a protracted social movement raised aware-
ness about the systemic marginalization faced by people with disabilities in the
United States. It followed the earliest attempts to prohibit disability discrimina-
tion in employment through the enactment-with no lobbying from the disability
rights community and apparently entirely as an afterthought-of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.194 Section 504 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
what it termed "handicap' 195 by entities in receipt of federal funds, including fed-
eral agencies and federal contractors. 196 The campaign to have regulations pursu-
ant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 released by the appropriate federal authorities
spawned many of the first disability civil rights struggles and culminated in lengthy
and dramatic sit-ins by disability rights activists in many American cities in 1977.197
Disability rights activists also emphasized the importance of maintaining independ-
192. See generally Baker & Godwin, supra note 41.
193. See e.g. Eric Tucker, -Great Expectations Defeated?' The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining Regimes
in Canada and the United States Post-NAFTA" (2004) 26 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 97 at 109.
194. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
195. For a discussion of the distinctions between impairment, disability, and handicap, see generally Jerome
E. Bickenbach et al., "Models of Disablement, Universalism and the International Classification of
Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps" (1999) 48 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1173.
196. Linda H. Krieger, "Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash" (2000) 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 476 at 489;
Laura L. Rovner, "Disability, Equality and Identity" (2004) 55 Ala. L. Rev. 1043 at 1050.
197. Joseph P Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights Movement (New York.
Random House, 1993) at 64-69.
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ence for people with disabilities to counteract attempts by the Reagan Administration
to roll back progressive regulations drafted to implement section 504.198
The pressing need to expand civil rights for people with disabilities to the private
sector gradually led disability rights advocacy groups to go a step further and lobby
Congress in the 1980s to enact the ADA. 199 This measure was, however, an ordin-
ary piece of legislation, unlike Canada's 1982 adoption of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and the accordance of quasi-constitutional status to federal and provincial
human rights statutes. 20 0 American case law is clear that legislative classifications
made on the basis of disability do not receive heightened scrutiny but merely have to
be defended rationally.
20 1
Title I of the ADA prohibits employers with fifteen or more employees from dis-
criminating against qualified people with disabilities.20 2 The definition of disability
adopted in the ADA is identical to the definition that was used in section 504.203
Specifically, a person is classified as having a disability if he or she has (1) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of that individual's major
life activities, (2) has a record of such an impairment or (3) is regarded as having such
an impairment.20 4 A person who meets the definition contained in any one of the
three prongs is entitled to reasonable accommodations, tailored to that individual's
particular circumstances, which do not amount to undue hardship.
20 5
198. Bagenstos, "Americans", supra note 71 at 964-65.
199. Chai R. Feldblum, "Definition of Disability under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened?
Why? And What Can We Do About It?" (2000) 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 91 at 126-27. As the duty
to accommodate workers religious with religious beliefs was held to be de minimis in Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), there was never any cross-fertilization, unlike in Canadian
jurisprudence, between the duty to accommodate workers with religious beliefs and workers with dis-
abilities in the United States. See generally Malhotra, "Legal Genealogy" supra note 138.
200. See supra note 129, and accompanying text.
201. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centre, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
202. Linda H. Krieger, "Foreword-Backlash against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implica-
tions for Social Justice Strategies" (2000) 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 at 6. Title I contained a two-
year phase-in period, ending in 1994, where only employers with twenty-five or more employees were
subject to the ADA.
203. Bonnie Poitras Tucker, "The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability under the ADA: A Return to the
Dark Ages" (2000) 52 Ala. L. Rev. 321 at 323 [Tucker, "The Supreme Court's"].
204. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (2004).
205. Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Department ofAdministration, 44 E3d 538 at 542 (7th Cir.1995). For
a brief outline of how an ADA employment discrimination case proceeds, see Ruth Colker & Bonnie
Poitras Tucker, The Law of Disability Discrimination, 3rd ed. (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing, 2000)
at 233-34. See also Robert A. Dubault, Note, "The ADA and the NLRA: Balancing Individual and
Collective Rights" (1995) 70 Ind. L.J. 1271 at 1273; Steven L. Willborn, "The Nonevolution of Enforce-
ment under the ADA: Discharge Cases and the Hiring Problem" in Peter D. Blanck, ed., Employment,
Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Issues in Law, Public Policy and Research (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 2000) 103 at 104 (noting that ADA enforcement parallels the proce-
dure under Title VII).
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Unfortunately, whereas Canadian jurisprudence on disability discrimination in
employment has moved in a direction that takes more seriously the systemic dis-
crimination faced by people with disabilities, the ADA Title I jurisprudence has been
plagued by a series of setbacks. Indeed, employers win the vast majority of lawsuits
filed under Title 1.206 First, in a series of cases known as the Sutton trilogy,20 7 the
United States Supreme Court has narrowed the definition of disability. In Sutton v.
United Air Lines, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs, who sought
to work as airline pilots and whose uncorrected vision fell far below the standard
required by the employer, could be evaluated only regarding whether they were sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity after one had taken into account any mitigat-
ing measures.20 8 These include appliances, pharmaceutical products and even the
body's own compensating mechanisms. 20 9 The majority also rejected the argument
that the plaintiffs were substantially limited in the major life activity of working be-
cause the limitation affected only a narrow class of jobs. The regulations issued by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] are clear that a disability
must affect a person's ability to perform a class ofjobs or a broad range of jobs in vari-
ous classes.210 Therefore, the plaintiffs were held to not be people with disabilities
as defined in the ADA even though, paradoxically, their impairments were the very
reason that the defendant airline refused to hire them.211 Moreover, the EEOC regu-
lations suggesting a much broader definition of disability were ignored.212
In Murphy v. United Parcel Service,213 the United States Supreme Court held that a
mechanic who was fired because his high blood pressure exceeded regulatory stan-
dards for commercial drivers was not a person with a disability under the ADA be-
cause the evaluation had to take into account the mitigating effects of medication. 214
When the plaintiff was medicated, he had virtually no activity limitations with major
life activities and therefore he was not a person with a disability for the purposes of
206. See e.g. Ruth Colker, "The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants" (1999) 34 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99 at 99-100.
207. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999) (truck driver's visual impairment did not con-
stitute a substantial limitation so as to qualify under the ADA) [Albertsons]; Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999) (petitioner commercial driver with hypertension did not constitute a
substantial limitation so as to qualify under the ADA) [Murphy]; Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct.
2139 (1999) (petitioner airline pilots with severe myopia correctable through use of glasses did not
have substantial limitations so as to qualify under the ADA) [Sutton].
208. Sutton, ibid. at 2146-47.
209. Weber, "The Americans", supra note 30 at 378.
210. Sutton, supra note 207 at 2151.
211. Tucker, "The Supreme Court's" supra note 203 at 331.
212. Sutton, supra note 207 at 2146.
213. Murphy, supra note 207.
214. Ibid. at2137.
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the ADA. 2 15 The Supreme Court also ruled that the fact that the plaintiff could not
meet regulatory certification standards for commercial driving did not constitute
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working because the limitation
affected only a narrow class of jobs.2 16 The combined effect of the two rules means
that many impairments that affect workers but may be imperfectly mitigated or who
work in unusual industries may not be considered disabilities at all under the ADA
yet may be significant enough to warrant dismissal by their employer.217 Even the
factual reasoning in this decision seems dubious. In concluding that Murphy was
wrongly decided, disability scholar Samuel Bagenstos has observed that the plain-
tiff's high blood pressure excluded him from literally millions of jobs.
218
Finally, in the third case in the trilogy, Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,2 19 the United
States Supreme Court held that a visually impaired truck driver's disability status had to
be evaluated by considering the effect of his body's compensatory system in adjusting
to his visual impairment, just as the Court's dictates require plaintiffs to mitigate using
other more conventional measures.220 The majority found that, despite the fact there
was a significant difference in the way the plaintiff observed the world, this did not
amount to a substantial limitation for the purposes of the ADA.221 Yet again the plain-
tiff's disability was sufficient to warrant dismissal by the employer but was not sufficient
to be covered by the ADA.222 A more recent decision, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc.
v. Williams,223 reached the conclusion that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
had applied the wrong test in evaluating a disability discrimination claim by a woman
with carpal tunnel syndrome who was unable to perform requirements of her job on an
automobile assembly line because the lower court had wrongly focused on the effects
of the claimant's disability in her specific workplace rather than on a variety of activities
central to most people's lives in and out of the workplace. 224 Collectively, these cases
represent an ominous narrowing of the definition of disability for the purposes of the
ADA. Insulin-dependent diabetics, for instance, who can mostly but not perfectly con-
215. Ibid. This was the conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeals but the Petitioner did not seek certiorari
on whether this conclusion was correct.
216. Ibid. at 2138-39.
217. Tucker, "The Supreme Court's" supra note 203 at 333.
218. Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Subordination, Stigma and 'Disability" (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 397 at 402 [Bagen-
stos, "Subordination"].
219. Albertsons, supra note 207.
220. Ibid. at 2168-69.
221. Ibid. at 2168.
222. Tucker, "The Supreme Court's" supra note 203 at 334.
223. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (decision on whether woman with
carpal tunnel syndrome working in auto plant is disabled remanded back to lower courts).
224. Ibid. at 200-0 1. This particular restriction is especially bizarre when evaluating employment discrimi-
nation and contrasts fundamentally with the Canadian approach of closely evaluating the accommoda-
tion needs in the workplace in question.
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trol their disabilities through medication may no longer be classified as disabled for
the purposes of the ADA and, without reasonable accommodations, may be unable to
work.225 An extensive analysis of the statutory interpretation of the ADA is far beyond
the scope of this article.226 However, these rulings have prevented many people with
genuine disabilities from asserting their rights.
A second major problem is the constitutionality of major parts of the ADA have been
called into question as a result of the United States Supreme Court's New Federalism
jurisprudence, which more aggressively enforces the power of the states under the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution vis-a-vis the federal govern-
ment than has been true in past years. The Eleventh Amendment protects states'
sovereign immunity by prohibiting citizens of another state or of foreign states from
suing a state of the United States in federal courts. However, it has been consistently
interpreted as also prohibiting a state's own citizens from suing the state in federal
court for damage remedies.227 Under some circumstances, Congress may be empow-
ered under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass civil rights laws, such as
the ADA, that abrogate state sovereignty.228 The precise nature and scope of those
circumstances was defined in the Supreme Court decision City of Boerne v. Flores as
requiring the law to demonstrate congruence and proportionality between the injury
and the means sought to remedy it.
22 9
In Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama v. Garrett, the United States Supreme
Court held in a narrow 5-4 decision by Chief Justice Rehnquist, as he then was, that
lawsuits for money damages under Title I of the ADA were barred because it failed
to meet the test of congruence and proportionality that the Court had established
in City of Boerne for constitutionally permissible abrogation of a state's sovereign
immunity.230 Therefore, in one dramatic stroke, a major class of employers-state
governments and their agencies-was eliminated from coverage of the ADA because
insufficient evidence of a pattern of discrimination against workers with disabilities
had been demonstrated to justify the abrogation of a state's sovereign immunity
through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It remains
unclear to what extent other parts of the ADA may similarly fall victim to the New
Federalism.
231
225. Tucker, "The Supreme Court's" supra note 203 at 346-48.
226. But see generally Bagenstos, "Subordination, supra note 218 (arguing that stigma ought to be used as
organizing principle for determining what impairments ought to be classified as disabilities for ADA
purposes).
227. Michael E. Waterstone, "Lane, Fundamental Rights and Voting" (2005) 56 Ala. L. Rev. 793 at 798, n. 20.
228. Ibid. at 798.
229. 521 U.S. 507 at 520 (1997) [City of Boerne].
230. 531 U.S. 356 (2001) [Garrett].
231. See e.g. Tennessee v. Lane et al., 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (ruling 5-4 that Congress properly abrogated state
sovereign immunity through the 14th Amendment in requiring wheelchair access to state courts). For
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This brief overview underscores another dimension of the insights that may be
gleaned through comparative scholarship. Whereas the duty to accommodate work-
ers with disabilities is interpreted broadly in Canada and leaves employers to make
their arguments on the grounds of undue hardship, a variety of legal rules are invoked
to restrict the definition of disability in the employment context in the United States.
This is of course compounded by the fact that fewer than one in ten private sector
workers is now unionized as the American union movement continues its terminal
decline. 232 Environmental access features do not have the appropriate outcomes, at
least in part because efficacy under the ADA is thwarted by the draconian interpreta-
tion given to it by the courts.
Yet political activism again remains central. On 25 September 2008, President Bush
signed the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 after years of
lobbying by disability rights advocacy groups. 233 The law addresses the concerns of
disability activists by clarifying that the definition of disability encompasses a very
broad spectrum. Therefore, the formalist rulings in the Sutton trilogy and in Toyota
are effectively overruled by statute including the requirement that a person's disability
be evaluated after taking into account the effect of mitigating measures.234 However,
the legislation does not address the vexing federalism questions that are likely to
continue to plague jurisprudence in this area. Activists will have to remain vigilant to
ensure that future disability discrimination claims are not thwarted by the vagaries of
the federalism jurisprudence.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I have provided a synopsis of the socio-economic conditions facing
people with disabilities in Canada and the United States. As well, I have shown how
barriers in two particular areas-transportation and attendant care services-have
significant negative effects for workers with disabilities. Finally, I provided a brief
overview of disability rights law as it affects workers in the two countries and why
there are key differences between them. What stands out is the profound margin-
alization of people with disabilities in both countries. While the United States has
relatively enlightened accessible transportation policies and Canada has relatively
generous labour market policies for those people with disabilities who are already
in the labour market, poverty and unemployment remain the fate for far too many
an analysis, see Anita Silvers & Leslie Pickering Francis, "A New Start on the Road Not Taken: Driving
with Lane to Head Off Disability-Based Denial of Rights" (2007) 23 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 33.
232. Mark Barenberg, "Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureau-
cratic to Flexible Production" (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 753 at 758.
233. Alex B. Long, "Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008", available online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.coml
abstract=1273922>.
234. Ibid. at 4. A partial exception is made for eyeglasses and contact lenses.
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people with disabilities. This fact suggests each country can learn from the experi-
ences of the other. Canadian disability rights activists have much they can learn from
the experiences of grassroots organizations like ADAPT. The state-centric nature of
lobbying in Canada has undermined the potential for advocates to find their own
voices through creative struggles from below. Without such activism, the relatively
strong union density in Canada will not benefit people with disabilities, particularly
blind and mobility impaired Canadians. On the other hand, American disability
rights activists have accomplished a great deal in making transportation accessible
but have been thwarted by the courts because of the narrow jurisprudence under the
ADA. In 2008, legislation to remedy these rulings was finally enacted into law after
years of pressure by disability rights advocates. Both countries need to develop better
attendant services programs. Policy-makers in both countries will have to carefully
consider a multi-pronged approach to address the systemic discrimination facing
Canadians and Americans with disabilities.
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